Piercing the Corporate Veil: OE and Army Transformation

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The Army's experience with organization development (OD) from 1975 to 1985 still resonates. Despite the Army Organizational Effectiveness (OE) Program's demise as a system-wide management philosophy, artifacts such as sensing sessions and using off-site locations, command climate surveys, centers of excellence, outreach programs, change-of-command transitions and after-action reviews are still being practiced. The reasons the Army widely adopted then abandoned OE show how large organizations make decisions contrary to collaborative and "participative" management philosophy. Although the Army faces another near-term transformation, it has not adopted a systemwide management philosophy to replace OE.

The first post-Cold War Chief of Staff, US Army (CSA), General Gordon R. Sullivan, successfully downsized the Army by almost half, releasing nearly 600,000 soldiers and civilians. Ironically, he accomplished this using OD and its twin, organization transformation (OT), and techniques and philosophies a previous Army chief of staff had abandoned a decade earlier. Team building, transformation, organizational learning and investing in people were the overarching OD philosophies Sullivan used to change the post-Cold War Army.[1] In retrospect, this was the Army's most successful transformation.[2]

Organization Development

Penn State University professor Rupert F. Chisholm, in his 1991 public administration course, defined OD as "a systemwide application of behavioral science knowledge of the planned development and reinforcement of organizational strategies, structures and processes for improving an organization's effectiveness."[3] Chisholm described OD characteristics as including "long-term effort; systems focus; increasingly interdisciplinary attempts to create, plan, manage, and institutionalize change; [a] focus on human development and learning; interventions at multiple levels with multiple thrusts; and ultimately creat[ing] organizational systems that solve their own problems."[4]

OD emerged as a discipline during and immediately after World War II, which witnessed a boom in social science theory and research. OD combined aspects of management theory and practice, sociology, psychology and systems theory into an integrated philosophy of how to improve organizations through team building and interpersonal feedback. OD's enduring values—trust, openness and collaboration—were integrated into a practical approach for systems improvement.[5] OD's "client-system" might range from individual relationships to small groups and larger departments all the way to an entire organization.

For OD to work best, organizational systems must be *open.* Open systems and why changes occur are interactions among demands from the outside environment, changing organizational values and increasingly complex tasks.[6] The OD perspective might focus on intragroup or intergroup systems and how client-systems can form seamless human relationships with new technologies. In OD, technologies include all "knowledge, information, material resources, techniques and procedures" the organization or its subsystem uses to convert input into output—that is, what it uses to perform its mission.[7]

OD's two major assumptions are that system members can solve their own problems and that high-performance organizations possess ideal characteristics. The former relates to management theorist Douglas McGregor's assumptions outlined in "Theory Y" and collaboration methods between consultants and organizational systems. The latter refers to *a priori* effects of open market competition and the desire to satisfy stakeholders and customers. There are five main tenets of OD operations: team building (t-group methods); action research and survey feedback; participative management; productivity and quality of work life; and strategic change.[8]

Action research, or action theory, refers to the notion that the person is not only the object but the subject of research. People participating in action research examine intimately their own organizations, diagnose their own systems and solve problems.[9] Change is considered continuous, not episodic.[10]

Survey feedback is a five-step process in which the organization and consultants plan and administer a survey, analyze data, report findings to all organizational levels and develop action plans.[11] Survey feedback must be relevant, understandable, descriptive, verifiable, timely, limited, significant, comparative and unfinalized.[12] The mainstay instruments for feedback collection are questionnaires, sensing sessions, interviews, file archives and process observations.

Participative management encourages members at all levels to share their opinions and information for collaborative diagnoses and interventions. Senior executives and managers must accept this philosophy before an OD approach is initiated. Participative management is usually linked to a healthy climate

and an organization ready for change. Involving or empowering workers is vital to the OD systems approach.

Productivity and quality of work life refer to accepting that a satisfied work force is a better-producing work force. Related to empowerment, this OD root also considers the working environment, sociotechnical issues, communications, rewards, employee development and other employee enrichments as investments in productivity. Contemporary strategies such as quality circles, total quality management and reengineering also stem from this philosophy.

Strategic change considers the entire organization and its relationship to its environment. Once senior executives fully embrace OD tenets and values, they must align followers with the strategic needs and environmental demands. Again, the open systems model exemplifies the perspective OD takes on strategic change and the "learning organization." Harvard Professor of Business Administration Michael Beer views an organization's strategic alignment as its readiness to change. According to Beer, actors and events that push the organization to change include owners, legislation, employees, trade unions and changing social values.[13]

Army OE's Rise

In the wake of the tough lessons learned from the Army's reduction in force after the Vietnam War, it invested heavily in a relatively new OD philosophy called organizational effectiveness (OE). In early 1977 the Army had a $26.5 billion budget; 780,000 soldiers on active duty in 24 divisions; hundreds of nondivision units; 545,000 Reserve Component members scattered among 6,500 units; and 400,000 Department of Defense (DOD) civilian employees.[14]

Compare those statistics with a contemporary OD-oriented company—Boeing. Boeing had about $4 billion in revenue and employed thousands of people. It was considered a large-scale challenge for OD, but it was nowhere near the size of the US Army.[15]

In the early 1970s, CSA General Creighton W. Abrams and his huge, complex organization faced daunting obstacles. During the Vietnam War and its aftermath, the Army sought to change from within. Transitioning to an all-volunteer force and reducing widespread lack of discipline, which stemmed from racial strife and drug use, were huge challenges.

Making large-scale structural changes and incorporating warfighting breakthroughs while facing numerically overwhelming Warsaw Pact forces were seemingly impossible. In 1972, Abrams commissioned a comprehensive prototype motivational development program to:

- Broaden the concepts and doctrine for military personnel management and leadership by capitalizing on behavioral science knowledge.
- Initiate a three-year experimental program in a variety of Army organizations to determine the utility of systematically applying techniques to increase individual and organizational effectiveness.
- Educate and train personnel management staff officers to implement useful concepts and techniques.
- Orient and educate commanders on the applicability of advanced management and behavioral science technology.[16]

Abrams perceived that OD, a relatively recent and emerging field in the private sector, would obviously help turn around a vital, yet failing, Army.

Army OE Institutionalization

On 1 July 1975, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) established the Army Organizational Effectiveness Training Center (OETC) at Fort Ord, California. Its mission was to:

- Define and refine OE concepts, procedures, methodologies and techniques.
- Develop training and course material for a 16-week, intensive OE education and training program.
- Award the "5Z" personnel skill identifier to organizational effectiveness staff officers (OESOs).
- Develop literature pertinent to Army OE.
- Maintain technical contact with operating OESOs and with civilian and military organizations concerned with OE.

The school developed and taught, among others, managing conflict, evaluating survey data and briefing OE. The core curriculum included organizational theory; leadership and management development; OESO competencies; assessment and evaluation methodology; planning techniques; implementation strategies, including a field training exercise; and recruited guest speakers.[17] Initially, attendance requirements specified that the candidate:

- Was to be a captain or major (lieutenant colonel by exception).
- Was to have a primary or alternate specialty in personnel management.
- Had to have been projected for assignment as an OESO.
- Had to be a career-course graduate.
- Had to have received a baccalaureate-level college degree, preferably with a concentration in one of the behavioral or management sciences.[18]

Unit organization authorization added approximately two OESO positions for divisions and major installations across the Army. Army doctrine development began, exportable curriculum materials were sent to other Army schools, and senior leaders were briefed on the impending program. OD's command-centered concept showed that Army OD pioneers understood how to adapt OD into a culturally acceptable Army OE model. Yet, the adaptation could not pierce the Army's institutional-cultural veil, which contributed to the Army OE program's downfall.

In 1977, OETC began publishing a professional journal, the *OE Communiqué* (changed to the *OE Journal* from 1982 to 1985).[19] By 1978 the Army was publishing a shirt-pocket-size *Commander's Guide to Organizational Effectiveness* as a training circular—OE's first Armywide doctrinal publication.[20] The contents were well-presented and gave concerned commanders and staffs all they needed to understand OE's entry, contracting, diagnostics, intervention and follow-up techniques. Army "organizational processes" included

adaptations of OD concepts—"sensing; communicating information; decision-making; communicating decisions; implementation actions; stabilizing; feedback; leadership; planning; goal integrating; motivating; supervising; conflict managing; training and developing; and coordinating."[21] Doctrine prescribed OE-enlightened commanders to perform OE interventions without a part- or full-time OESO.

By 1979, 572 staff officers had attended OETC. For fiscal years 1980 through 1986, the Army produced a comprehensive 3- to 10-year plan to shift from OE's human relations (lower level) aspects to greater emphasis on broader total systems and complex organizations. The future focus would shift OE to a larger scale, emphasizing program management; resource and manpower structure; personnel selection and assignment; research; evaluation; education and training; and information.[22]

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Army conducted several studies to determine whether OE was working. Reported successes supported the Army's 3- to 10-year plan and were translated into more actions to institutionalize OE. By 1980 the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and virtually all Army school curriculums required modules of OE instruction.[23] In May 1980 the US Army National Guard (ARNG) received its first OESO authorized positions.[24]

Studies warned that careful selection of OESOs and their continued career success was crucial to sustaining and enlarging the program's scope. In just a few years the Army had taken major steps to institutionalize OE and broaden its interventions. As OE was poised to penetrate the functional Army's core competencies, the leadership opportunity was terminated because OE was perceived as being:

- A bad choice among alternatives in a rational decision-making process.
- An unnecessary, conflicting policy stream that made organizational change too diffuse to become routine.
- A threat to a large and traditional bureaucracy.

The Fall of Army OE

OD continued to be viable in improving effectiveness in other organizations, but by the mid-1980s the Army had largely discarded it. Analyst Graham T. Allison's three conceptual models best explain why.[25]

Rational actor model. From the perspective of wisely using the Army's scarce funds, dismantling OE was a sound, obvious and purposeful choice.[26] Allison contends that "monoliths perform large actions for big reasons [based on] appreciation of the facts."[27] The rational actor model is based on the idea that a single, rational decision maker makes a completely informed and value-maximizing decision.

In 1985, amid President Ronald Reagan's military buildup, leaders had to make many tough decisions on where to invest in Army initiatives. Although Army OE proponents reported saving hundreds of millions of dollars (far exceeding the cost of the program), the results of these studies were "rarely shared, validated, or duplicated."[28]

In an informal, private meeting, TRADOC commander General Bill Richardson convinced CSA General John A. Wickham Jr. that supporting a new, expensive Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) over the OE program was a good choice.[29] Wickham decisively relegated OE to an adjunct program for personnel officers; the school would be closed; and OE internal consultants would be used to fill other, more important Army needs. This purely resource-driven decision was based on the Army's instrumental, rational priorities. The JRTC program would significantly benefit, ultimately making the Army an even better instrument for US national security.

Wickham's decision was made in relative haste, based on Richardson's analysis, not that of his own staff. How would the transition progress if they were using a rational actor model?

Organizational behavior model. The organizational behavior model is based on the theory that the Army "consists of a conglomerate of semi-feudal, loosely allied organizations, each substantially with a life of its own."[30] Decision behavior is based on the influence of member organizations' routine processes and policies.

There are two major theories of how policy-implementation processes work in large government institutions. One is a top-down approach described as forward mapping. The other is a bottom-up model known as backward mapping.[31]

Researcher Richard F. Elmore describes forward mapping as beginning "at the top of the process, with as clear a statement as possible of the policymaker's intent [then proceeding] through a sequence of increasingly more specific steps to define what is expected of implementers at each level. [Forward mapping organizations] tend to centralize control [through factors] that are easily manipulated by policymakers: funding formulas; formal organizational structures; authority relationships among administrative units; regulations; and administrative controls (budget, planning and evaluation requirements)."[32]

Elmore describes backward mapping as beginning "not with a statement of intent, but with a statement of specific behavior at the lowest level of the implementation process that generates a need for policy. . . . The objective is first stated as a set of organizational operations and then as a set of effects, or outcomes, that will result from these operations. . . . [T]he closer one is to the source of the problem, the greater is one's ability to influence it; and the problem-solving ability of complex systems depends not on hierarchical control but on maximizing discretion at the point where the problem is most immediate."[33]

Elmore's descriptions show that organizational power in a forward-mapping organization places policy decisions at the top, while backward-mapping organizations diffuse power and formulate policy at the lowest implementing levels. Clearly, OD philosophy orients on the latter while traditional Army organizational culture and structure strongly favor the former.

TRADOC was created in 1973 "to develop doctrine, weapons systems, equipment, organization and training needed to ensure that soldiers are

ready to fight and win on tomorrow's battlefield. [TRADOC has been the] principal designer, developer and producer of training devices and materials for the Army" ever since.[34] In short, the Army created TRADOC to manage large-scale change in response to Vietnam issues and Wickham's postwar vision.

Everything from how to train; how to fight; how to educate; and organizational roles, missions and structure emanated from TRADOC as the Army's single policy manager for force development. If the Army's fielded organizations were effective, it was because TRADOC designed the unit structure that way from top to bottom. TRADOC remains the Army's forward-mapping agent for change.

It is no wonder that OE, which embraced an OD backward-mapping method, was at odds with TRADOC. TRADOC was the Army's resource manager for the OE program, so the two juxtaposed philosophies for change could not continue without interfering with each other.

Early OE efforts oriented on improving the human aspects of field organizations designed by TRADOC. But the program was building momentum to begin stepping over the boundaries of its parent authority. OE was at cross-purposes with TRADOC, and TRADOC had to throw out the baby with the bath water to sustain its routine change policies and processes. Wickham had merely rubber-stamped this organizational necessity. Two opposing change agents had met, and the stronger organizational behavior had prevailed.

Wickham, the same decision maker who killed the Army OE program in 1985, also said: "At the crossroads on the path that leads to the future, each creative spirit is opposed by 1,000 men appointed to guard the pass. We need to protect and help those creative spirits. . . . The world is filled—and the Army is not different—with legions of naysayers. NIH, "not invented here," is a rampant disease. . . . Championing new ideas is important. . . . We need to be constantly in search of excellence and reward it."[35]

How can an individual who believed philosophically in the OD tenets and values of participative and collaborative management have decided so quickly to end the program? The rational actor model fails to reconcile this discrepancy completely. Given his position of authority and fundamental beliefs in empowerment, why did he not overrule TRADOC as an organizational owner of the change processes and keep OD/OE? If TRADOC was at organizational odds with OD philosophy, why did the OE program flourish for more than a decade? The organizational behavior model does not address these issues entirely.

Bureaucratic politics model. The bureaucratic politics model considers an organization's individual players, including chiefs, staffs and other actors who participate in the political-decision game. At the core of the model are players' personalities and parochial, culture-driven priorities.[36]

The players' power stems from bargaining advantages, building coalitions, skill and will. In this case, "action does not presuppose intention"; that is, Wickham's intent was not important to the outcome.[37] The more important variable was position in the organization, and where one sits in a large bureaucracy, coupled with roles, beliefs and values, determines how participants shape the outcome—"not by a careful selection of the optimal choice from available alternatives, but in terms of shifting dominance of bureaucratic coalitions."[38]

Most efficacy studies involving OD and Army OE were unique case studies because each organization was different, and interventions were tailored to the needs of the client-system. Some thought OE ended because those who controlled the Army budget never accepted OE cost and methods without some centralized control and accounting of the program's efficacy.[39] Those kinds of controls would have been contrary to OE's voluntary nature, confidentiality and decentralization.

The actors who influenced Richardson's and Wickham's attention and decision to halt the OE program were likely opposed to the "nature of 'touchy-feely' OE [that] flies in the face of snake-eatin', ass-kickin', REAL Army guys."[40] Also, those who were involved in the bureaucratic political coalition to remove OE were likely disgruntled senior officers unhappy with watching their superiors embrace OE as an alternative to their traditional staff advice and counsel for policy and change.

When these colonels became generals, the opportunity arose for removing this "cancerous growth." Termination probably began when they entered positions to control schooling and subsequent assignments of OESOs (hence, training less-than-adequate career performers). Attrition took its toll. Throughout the Army, OE operations were being managed not by the carefully selected, high-energy change agents of the late 1970s but by those identified as unsuccessful in the mainstream Army.[41] Through bureaucratic politics, the OE program ended as a less-competitive, weaker power coalition.

Until OE, the Army had never adopted a systemwide management philosophy and still does not recognize a replacement. Is this a calculated decision because there is no void to fill, or is it a reaction to unsuccessful OE investments by decision makers, organizations and bureaucrats? The Army established Total Army Quality (TAQ) "to emphasize the importance of improving performance and efficiency across the board."[42] But this forward-mapping strategy addresses the functional Army and only indirectly penetrates the field Army as a management scheme. Why? The truth is that the Army is really two concentric organizations: an institutional one (the outer buffer) that encompasses a fielded one (the technical core).

In his book, *Organizational Action,* James D. Thompson offers this proposition: "Under norms of rationality, organizations seek to buffer environmental influences by surrounding their technical cores with input and output components."[43]

Using Thompson's theory, the open-systems model might apply to the functional Department of the Army (DA) that protectively wraps the field Army—its technical core. Thus, the field Army is traditionally and purposefully relegated to a closed-system management philosophy.[44] In the instrumental rationality

arena of action, the field Army is not supposed to change itself. In fact, the standardization processes that TRADOC and other agencies create and manage provide controlled change input to the field Army.

All three explanations for the rise and fall of Army OD hold some degree of truth—all operate in the context of the outer ring of Army organization. The outer ring could not buffer the ring that the OE approach called for.

Future of Change Management

There are two major forces at work that might penetrate DA's protective covering and re-energize internal change agents to re-emerge in the inner core—joint vision and technology. Joint vision is a future-looking initiative by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (fueled by the penetrating policy of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986) that pushes to integrate the fielded Army farther into the joint circle and farther from the Army's outer circle of institutional protection. Technological force grows as the outer circle continues to organize, train and equip the inner circle. Autonomous operations enabled by such technology make DA's protective covering more porous. The resulting effects will always be the "workarounds" of change now possible by the field Army and ad hoc approaches to conducting operations never intended or foreseen by the institutional outer circle. Ad hoc organizations and innovation in European-based Army operations in the past five years occurred despite the institutional Army's best efforts to control that change.

If the Army is to survive as an institution and protect the field force from uncontrolled change, it must somehow become an agent of change in the joint arena. To participate in that transition, it must reopen the technical core's inner circle. A return to a bottom-up (backward-mapping) management philosophy is essential. Otherwise a radical kick would soon shatter the stability of both inner and outer Army organizations.

The Army must sponsor joint innovations that reward the field force with new technologies and flexible organizational structure, procedures and problem-solving techniques. This might mean kissing standardization goodbye—a radical but necessary departure for the future. Because OD and OT have progressed well as an art and science in the civilian world, perhaps the Army should consider returning to OD and OT as a strategy for internal change management. The survival of the institution and, certainly, the current Transformation might depend on it.

NOTES

1. Gordon R. Sullivan and Michael V. Harper, *Hope is Not a Method: What Business Leaders Can Learn From America's Army* (New York, NY: Broadway Books, 1997), xvii.
2. Since the Spanish-American War, the United States has done a poor job of downsizing or demobilizing forces and has treated departing veterans relatively inhumanely. Demobilization after Vietnam was no exception.
3. Adapted from Rupert F. Chisholm, *What is OD?* classroom handout, Public Administration Course 511, Organizational Change and Development, Pennsylvania State University, Harrisburg, 12 September 1991.
4. Ibid.
5. Larry E. Greiner and Virginia E. Schein, *Power and Organization Development: Mobilizing Power to Change* (Reading, PA: Addison Wesley, 1988), 23-24.
6. Richard Beckhard and Reuben T. Harris, *Organizational Transition: Managing Complex Change* (Reading, PA: Addison Wesley, 1977), 9-14.
7. Chisholm, "Introducing Advanced Information Technology Into Public Organizations," *Public Productivity Review*, vol XI, no 4 (1968), 40.
8. Thomas G. Cummings and Christopher G. Worley, *Organization Development and Change*, 7th ed (Cincinnati, OH: South-Western College Publishing, 2001), 16.
9. Robert T. Golembiewski, "Public Sector Organizational Behavior and Theory: Perspectives on Nagging Problems and on Real Progress," in Naomi B. Lynn and Aaron Wildavsky, eds, *Public Administration: The State of the Discipline* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1990), 139.
10. Derived from Chisholm, "Improved Organizational Effectiveness: An OD Approach to Managing Change," classroom handout, Public Administration Course 511, Penn State University, Harrisburg, 1 June 1990.
11. Cummings and Worley, 133-34.
12. Ibid., 130-32.
13. Michael Beer, *Organizational Change and Development: A System View* (Santa Monica, CA: Goodyear Publishing Co., 1980), 80-81.
14. *Department of the Army Historical Summary Fiscal Year 1977* (Washington, DC: Center for Military History [CMH]), 39, 71, 87. Figures are rounded.
15. *The World Almanac and Book of Facts, 1978* (New York, NY: Newspaper Enterprise Association), 83.
16. Department of the Army (DA) Memorandum, Office of the Adjutant General, SUBJECT: Organizational Effectiveness (OE): Activities and Training, 3 May 1976, 2. An Army historical report says this about the project: "An Army Motivational Development Program was set up to examine leadership development and training as part of personnel management. Several pilot projects were begun, among them: an assessment center to provide officers and [noncommissioned officers] NCOs with personalized appraisals of their strengths, weaknesses and career options, etc; a survey feedback system that uses questionnaires and group problem-solving. . . ; management by objectives. . . ; job enrichment; and team building (*Department of the Army Historical Summary Fiscal Year 1973* (Washington, DC: CMH, 62).
17. DA, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Memorandum, "Command Briefing Script for OESO," 9 December 1977.
18. DA Memorandum, Office of the Adjutant General, 3 May 1976, 5.
19. November 1985 was the last issue of *Army OE* Journal (originally the *OE Communiqué*). The Army has not produced another management journal since.
20. DA Training Circular (TC) 26-1, *Commander's Guide to Organizational Effectiveness* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office [GPO], September 1978), 38-41.
21. Ibid.
22. *Department of the Army Historical Summary Fiscal Year 1979* (Washington, DC: CMH), 82-83. Also see the actual report, DA, *The Organizational Effectiveness 3-10 Year Plan, Fiscal Year 1980-1986*, (Washington, DC: CMH, 6 November 1979).
23. Roughly half of all Army majors are selected for the prestigious US Army Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC), indicating that OE institutionalization was attempting to reach future senior Army leaders. Period artifacts include a comprehensive publication for CGSOC students. DA Reference Book 12-2, *Organizational Effectiveness*, 3d ed (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), 1980).
24. *Department of the Army Historical Summary Fiscal Year 1980* (Washington, DC: CMH), 152.
25. Graham Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *Political Science Review*, vol LXIII, no 3, 689-718. The three models used in this article come directly from the same three models of analysis Allison used in his seminal approach to explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis from three perspectives.
26. D.N. Griffin in "Commandant's Comments," *Army Organizational Effectiveness Journal*, vol 9, no 5, says, "The Army has made a decision to terminate Organizational Effectiveness (OE) as a separately funded course in order to move scarce human resources to other endeavors," quoted by Benjamin J. Roberts and William F. Barko in "Organizational Development in the US Army: A Conceptual Case Analysis," *Public Administration Quarterly* (Fall 1986), 330.
27. Allison, 690.
28. Roberts and Barko, 332.
29. The informal meeting and Wickham's decision were reported in an interview with Barko, 15 September 2000, Carlisle, PA. Barko was a trained OESO and had knowledge of this termination process.
30. Allison, 698.
31. Described in Richard F. Elmore, "Backward Mapping: Implementation Research and Policy Decisions," *Policy Science Quarterly*, vol 94, no 4 (1979-1980), 601-16.
32. Ibid., 602, 605.
33. Ibid.
34. DA, *Training and Doctrine Command: A Perspective, FY 86-87* (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC, 1986), 1-1.
35. US Army Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Collected Works of the Thirtieth Chief of Staff, United States Army* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CGSC), 121, 236, online on 14 October 2000 at <http://call.army.mil/call/csa/wickham.htm>.
36. Allison, 709.
37. Ibid., 711.
38. Roberts and Barko, 333. These observers concluded that the bureaucratic political variables involved in the decision to end Army OE were important, but they attribute the downfall mainly to Army OE professionals' failure to properly market OE to their leaders.
39. See Ernest J. Lenz and Benjamin J. Roberts, "Consulting in a Military Setting," in Reuven Gal and A. David Mangelsdorff, eds, *Handbook of Military Psychology* (Chichester, NY: John Wiley and Sons), 684-85.
40. Personal correspondence with Captain Bill Masters, US Navy Reserve, 27 September 2000. Masters, a DA civilian, worked in Wickham's management policy office in the Pentagon during the rise and fall of Army OE.
41. Ibid. These ideas were substantiated in this correspondence and the interview I conducted with Barko, cited in note 29.
42. Office of the Chief of Staff, Army Management Directorate, Strategic Management and Innovations Division, *Army Performance Improvement Criteria (APIC) 1999* (Arlington, VA: 1999), iv.
43. James D. Thompson, *Organizations in Action: Social Science Basis of Administrative Theory* (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1967), 20.
44. CSA General Eric K. Shinseki's reading list for Army professionals is obviously geared to those in the field Army. The list does not include one management book or article, which indicates the invisible, yet protective, covering around the field Army. *(Editor's note: See page 80 in this issue for an annotated version of Shinseki's reading list.)*

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